




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
## Spending Review 2017

# Challenges for Investment in Police Expenditure: A Public Expenditure Perspective

July 2017

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This paper has been prepared by staff in the Department of Public Expenditure & Reform in the context of the Spending Review 2017. The views presented in this paper do not represent the official views of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform or the Department of Justice and Equality.



## Key Findings

The key findings/conclusions of this paper can be summarised as follows:

- The July 2016 Government Decision approving a five year reform and high level workforce plan for An Garda Síochána is estimated to lead to total Garda Expenditure increasing by at least 12% to approximately €1.8 billion by 2020. This is indicative and is based on projections made in 2016 and before other pressures are taken into account such as the new pay agreement, new policing operations, related non pay pressures and new capital projects including those which may arise due to increased accommodation requirements for new staff.
- Despite some isolated examples (Dublin Airport, Garda Analytical Service) in the past and more recently, the pace of reform on civilianisation including redeployment, one of the core priorities for reform, remains slow – this is consistent with past experience and is due to a wide range of factors. There is still scope for the pace of civilianisation to accelerate under the current reform programme and work is ongoing in this regard.
- If the Garda Inspectorate figure for posts which could be subject to civilianisation was achieved (1,500), the total annual salary saving is estimated to be in the order of €45m and an indicative total of 2.5m policing hours could be released to operational policing. There would also be significant pensions savings given the margin between the notional employer contribution rate for pre 2013 Gardaí compared to post 2013 civil servants (53% vs 8%). The margin decreases as the proportion of new Gardaí on the post 2013 scheme enter the service (14% vs 8%). Increasing the pace of civilianisation would facilitate efficiencies to fund other Garda priorities (e.g. recruitment) as well as lower overtime and would allow An Garda Síochána to increase the volume of policing services it can deliver within a given resourcing footprint.
- There is merit in exploring other possibilities in resource allocation for An Garda Síochána in addition to the traditional budgetary approach. In particular, developing a more granular approach to the funding and review of performance for specific policing priorities (e.g. crime operations, security) could help demonstrate and validate the policing dividend for communities arising from additional investment. This could include elements of an activity based model. Although such models can be

complex to introduce (e.g. apportionment of costs etc.) it would help make the budgetary process more evidence based.

- Linked to the above, there is the potential to build on the existing Garda model by developing an enhanced resource allocation model for policing drawing on parameters such as population, crime trends and other demand factors similar to those employed for other sectors e.g. education. This would be a useful input into the workforce planning process as well as the resource allocation process. The CAD (computer aided dispatch) project being prioritised could feed into providing some of the evidence and data for such allocations. Additionally, the review requested by the Minister for Justice and Equality last year regarding the disbursement of Garda resources, (which the Garda Inspectorate is currently undertaking for the Policing Authority), is intended to produce recommended criteria for the beginning of such a resource allocation model.
  
- The Government vision is for additional investment in An Garda Síochána to provide visible, effective and responsive policing. While additional investment may be forthcoming, subject to affordability constraints, it must be linked to demonstrated reforms. The Garda Inspectorate have produced a comprehensive set of recommendations as part of the Changing Policing in Ireland report which act as a blueprint for reform. From a public expenditure perspective, the key priorities for 21st Century Policing in Ireland arising from the Government's Garda Reform and investment programme, can be summarised as:
  - Significant increases in civilianisation facilitated by the redeployment of Garda members, the civilian by default policy and the recruitment of new civilians;
  - A robust data infrastructure for recording and reporting police statistics;
  - A more granular system to connect inputs with outputs and outcomes with a view to increasing the evidence of effectiveness;
  - Increased levels of timely performance reporting on the outputs and outcomes of policing including efficiency measures (e.g. proportion of workforce working on frontline policing, volume of emergency calls etc.);
  - Reduction of overtime to sustainable levels (4%-5% of pay)
  - A structured system to budget for overtime by category (e.g. courts, crime investigation) including a contingency for expected ad hoc events (e.g. State visits); and
  - Modelling the distribution of human resources by reference to population and demand; and
  - Utilisation of ICT and analytics to match policing resources to times and locations of peak demand as well as to promote greater productivity and effectiveness.

## Summary

### *Rationale*

- The economic rationale for the State's role in policing due its characteristics as a public good and its positive externalities are well understood.
- The priorities of An Garda Síochána are affected by other drivers not all of which are under its control (e.g. international events, social issues, constraints of other services).
- The activities of An Garda Síochána have important downstream links within the Criminal Justice system (e.g. Prisons, Courts, Probation) as well as lateral links with other sectors such as health, housing and education.

### *Trend Analysis – Expenditure, Numbers and Overtime (Inputs)*

- The level of spending on policing services rose rapidly during the 2000s at an annual average rate of 9% and, while it retrenched during the financial crisis, is close again to its peak in 2009.
- The current level of Garda numbers at end quarter 1 2016 is 13,600 (including trainees) or 13,017 (excluding trainees). This is lower than the peak in 2008/2009 but higher than most of the period 1970 to 2005.
- International comparisons of police numbers can be difficult to interpret due to variation in the configuration of different police services, differences in population densities, differing levels of demand for policing services as well as the existence of unitary or multiple police services.
- Overtime and allowances collectively account for approximately 30% of total pay expenditure.
- Allowances are mainly driven by Garda numbers and entitlement rules. It is affected by the industrial relations environment. Overtime is subject to control to a greater extent.
- After a period of continuous reduction, the level of expenditure on overtime is rising rapidly and is high by international norms (9.3% of the Garda pay bill in 2016)
- There is the risk that existing high levels of overtime will become embedded in the system at a high opportunity cost given the other alternative uses with higher returns e.g. capital investment in ICT.

### *Garda Reform including Civilianisation*

- The implementation of the agreed recommendations of the Garda Inspectorate Report “Changing Policing in Ireland” through the vehicle of the Modernisation and Renewal Programme 2016 to 2021, (overseen by the Policing Authority and reporting to the Minister for Justice and Equality), is the key framework for delivering the requirement improvements in policing services.
- The Garda workforce plan has significant potential as a planning tool to integrate the efficiencies to be generated through civilianisation, increased ICT investment and greater use of the reserves as well as to illustrate the business case justification for increased policing numbers.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.2 Rationale for Topic Selection

The estimate for Garda pay of just over €1 billion for 2016 accounts for approximately 42% of gross current expenditure for the Justice Group and represents the core component of annual budgetary settlements for An Garda Síochána. Similar to expenditure on the Defence Forces, pay for human services is the key driver for Garda Síochána expenditure. In addition to its materiality, the rationale for selecting this area for further analysis is based on the following factors:

- the Garda Modernisation and Renewal Programme 2016 to 2021 - the current framework for Garda reform - is at the early stages of implementation and providing a public expenditure perspective on the resourcing implications is timely;
- An updated analysis of the potential benefits of an accelerated civilianisation programme is required given its importance as part of the Garda reform programme;
- Overtime is a constant driver of budget discussions and an understanding of the drivers and distribution of overtime expenditure would lead to a more informed budget engagement; and
- Garda pay is subject to a range of ongoing pressures including responding to emergency operational requirements.

Given the likely future increased resource allocation for An Garda Síochána (subject to affordability constraints), it is important that any investment is as evidence-informed as possible to ensure value for money for the citizen in the delivery of enhanced policing services. This must also include tangible evidence of reform to provide reassurance that additional spending is being targeted to the right areas. In that context, it is a worthwhile exercise from a public expenditure perspective to take stock of recent trends in expenditure, to note the current trajectory of investment in policing, to present the current progress of Garda reform and to explore alternatives to the current model of resource allocation.

## 1.2 Objectives

The objectives of this paper are as follows:

- To examine the medium term resourcing implications of the Garda Modernisation and Renewal Programme and the Government's Five Year Reform and High Level Workforce Plan for An Garda Síochána;
- To identify drivers of efficiencies which can provide for additional policing hours within existing resources following on from previous Garda Inspectorate reports and focusing on civilianisation; and
- To highlight the type of metrics required to assess demand for policing services and to measure the results of increased police investment in the context of potential new approaches to resource allocation including the new role of the Policing Authority.

This paper is the first of a series of DPER papers on policing. Some of the issues which are examined at a high level in this paper may be considered in more detail in subsequent publications by this Department or the Department of Justice and Equality.

## 1.3 Methodology

This is a desk based review. It is based on trend analysis to provide a medium term view on pay, staff numbers and overall expenditure. It also uses an adapted Programme Logic Model to map the link between resourcing and policing outcomes (see Appendix D) on an illustrative basis. Selected indicators (e.g. ratio of Garda number per population) have been used to compare police services in Ireland to international benchmarks. The main sources for the paper are as follows:

- DPER databank information on spending and staff numbers;
- CSO, D/Justice and An Garda Síochána data on crime statistics data (five year period);
- Published policy documents on previous reform initiatives, annual AGS reports and policing plans as well as the Garda Inspectorate Reports; and
- Garda Síochána management accounting information on payroll data for 2015 as well as the overtime budget for 2017.

As part of the quality assurance process there was also some engagement with the Department of Justice and Equality and the Spending Review Group in the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform.

## 1.4 Policing in Ireland

### Rationale for investment in policing

The rationale for State intervention in national policing is well understood. Policing can be seen as a public good because of the social benefits provided by State funded police services in deterring crime and investigating criminal acts. In particular, the benefits of public policing can't be excluded from any one group of people once the State begins to provide these services. From a market failure perspective, there are also spillover benefits associated with the provision of policing services<sup>1</sup> as community policing can increase the economic and amenity value of local areas by promoting public confidence in the safety of public spaces. From a basic human perspective, the need for security is also important and acts as a foundation to enable society to function and prosper (e.g. a country is more likely to attract visitors if it is secure).

Crime is usually linked to policing as part of the policy discussion. Crime imposes a burden on society. If a person is the victim of a theft or burglary, the costs of replacing the items taken from them and the administration of insurance claims can be estimated and aggregated nationally. Crime also triggers prevention costs such as gating and home alarm systems. Enterprises also incur these costs on a larger and often more sophisticated scale. Shops may have to install shutters or employ private security guards whilst those organisations that rely heavily on ICT may have to install and maintain anti-virus and anti-fraud technologies. Public confidence in policing/fear of crime are also issues which could affect FDI negatively with economic consequences. At a national level, crime also leads Government to fund not just policing services in terms of crime prevention and investigation but also the other areas of the Justice Sector such as the Courts Service, prison places, probation services, forensic science, legal aid and the cost of the independent prosecution service. The tangible costs of crime vary depending on the type of crime, its severity in terms of impact on those affected and its complexity.

Importantly, there are also intangible costs which are just as serious as the material costs of dealing with a crime. These include the effects of victimisation and feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Such feelings can result in a loss to the economy and society through sick leave and mental health costs but are important in their own right as they affect societal wellbeing. They may also lead to losses in output if individuals do not feel confident in accessing recreational services (restaurants etc.) during the evening or if tourists are deterred from visiting. If unaddressed there are also societal impacts relating to drug abuse, domestic violence etc. Separately, of course, individuals may also worry about crime even if they have not experienced it directly.

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<sup>1</sup> Policing services when referred to generally in this paper encompasses all functions carried out by An Garda Síochána including community safety, State security and immigration etc.



This is often an important barometer of public confidence in policing. Conversely, crime prevention can increase well being - a benefit to society. Both tangible and intangible costs all represent an opportunity cost to society. A more detailed exploration of the above issues may be found in a presentation provided by the IGEEES unit in the Department of Justice and Equality at a recent IGEEES conference. This draws on analysis this unit has carried out on the costs of crime and the possible application of cost of crime estimates to evaluations.<sup>2</sup>

Part of Government's task involves balancing the allocation of resources on policing with a normative view about what an acceptable level of crime is. As Becker points out, the optimal amount of crime is not zero because at some point the marginal costs of prevention exceed the marginal benefit of further reductions in crime.<sup>3</sup> This is theoretical to some degree as the annual budgeting process is not zero based and typically focuses on marginal increases (usually) in funding.

While the discussion above links crime to policing, it is important to note that policing is not the only instrument to deter and detect crime. Effective crime prevention needs a proactive, whole of society approach, one which ensures that interventions address local concerns and subject to the principle that resources are allocated efficiently.<sup>4</sup> Crime is also influenced by many other variables other than the deterrence effect of policing. These include the level of urbanisation, the level of deprivation, technology (e.g. better security systems on cars rendering car theft more difficult but increasing house burglaries to obtain keys), demographics (number of younger people), unemployment, as well as the incidence of social problems such as addiction. Similarly, policing activities encompass many more issues than just crime e.g. State security, road safety, protective services to victims of sexual assault etc.

### Objectives of An Garda Síochána

Established in 1922, An Garda Síochána is the unitary national police service in Ireland with a remit in both law enforcement and, unlike most other countries, national security. Its mission statement is *"To deliver professional policing and security services with the trust, confidence and support of the people we serve"*.

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<sup>2</sup> Crowe, D (2017), *Measuring the Cost of Crime*. IGEEES Conference. Dublin.

<sup>3</sup> Becker (1968) *Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach*. Journal of Political Economy 76, 1679-217

<sup>4</sup> Audit Commission,(2006) *Neighbourhood crime and anti-social Behaviour: Making places safer through improved local working*, London: Audit Commission for local authorities and the National Health Service in England.

The statutory functions of An Garda Síochána are set out in section 7 (1) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 as follows:

- a. Preserving peace and public order;
- b. Protecting life and property;
- c. Vindicating the human rights of each individual;
- d. Protecting the security of the State;
- e. Preventing crime;
- f. Bringing criminals to justice, including by detecting and investigating crime; and
- g. Regulating and controlling road traffic and improving road safety.

Section 7(3) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 also provides that “in addition to its functions under subsection (1) the Garda Síochána and its members have such functions as are conferred on them by law including those relating to immigration. Others include prosecutorial functions and vetting functions.

The Garda Commissioner is the accounting officer for the organisation and is also responsible for advising the Minister for Justice and Equality regarding policing and security matters. Appendix B presents a distribution of payroll costs by function and shows that 84% of Garda resources are dedicated to regional policing with 10% allocated to national and specialist services such as Special Detective Unit, Security and Intelligence, the Drugs and Organised Crime Bureau, the Economic Crime Bureau, national roads policing, the Garda National Protective Services Bureau and the Garda National Immigration Bureau.

There are six regions, each of which is divided into divisions commanded by a Chief Superintendent. Altogether there are 28 divisions. Each division is then divided into districts commanded by a Superintendent with the assistance of inspectors while the sergeants are responsible for managing sub-districts. The district policing model dates back to the foundation of the State. Altogether, there are 564 Garda Stations throughout the country. Some of these stations are only manned by one Garda and are attached to larger parent stations. Not all stations operate on a 24 hour 365 basis.

The number and regional distribution of policing stations is often a matter of public debate. The Garda Inspectorate note that it is expensive to operate many smaller stations with similar front desk responsibilities both in terms of resources but also in terms of the diversion of policing hours from patrolling and

investigation.<sup>5</sup> The availability of a Garda station in a given area can be perceived by communities as related to the incidence of crime even if crime rates do not bear this out. By way of background, it is worth noting that the programme of Garda station rationalisation in 2012/2013 led to the closure of 139 stations in order to allow frontline Gardaí to be managed and deployed with greater flexibility and in a more focused fashion.

On the issue of structures, it is important to note that An Garda Síochána are also carrying out a major reform which will see the building block of policing become the division rather than the district. This change will be accompanied by a move to a functional model of policing where superintendents will be assigned responsibilities on the basis of functions rather than geography. Each division would have a management team comprising the Chief Superintendent, superintendents and business supports including finance and HR provided by civilians with relevant expertise.

This reform is the Garda response to the Inspectorate Report (“Changing Policing in Ireland”) which identifies major difficulties with the current district model of policing where the local superintendent has full responsibility for a wide range of policing activity in his/her geographic area. The difficulties include:

- Highly inefficient deployment of resources across district boundaries;
- Widespread inconsistencies between districts in the provision of services;
- Duplicate operational, administrative and management units which take resources from patrol, investigative and community policing; and
- The very wide portfolio of responsibilities assigned to the District Officer.

An Garda Síochána has agreed with the Inspectorate’s assessment that roll-out nationwide could release approximately 250 Gardaí to front line duties due the amalgamation of administrative units.

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
<sup>5</sup> Garda Inspectorate (2015) *Changing Policing in Ireland*. Dublin (p.90)

## 2. Investment trends in An Garda Síochána

### 2.1 Aggregate expenditure

Figure 1 highlights total expenditure on An Garda Síochána since 1997. Up until 2009, spending increased rapidly at an annual average of 9%. Within 8 years spending had doubled. During the financial crisis, expenditure fell by an annual average of 4% from 2010 to 2014 before increasing again from 2015 to 2017. The current level of spending can only be considered low compared to the peak period of 2008 and 2009 – arguably a time of unsustainable expenditure levels.

**Figure 1: Total Garda Vote expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1997 to 2016**



Sources: CSO and INFOR system

Expenditure on policing as a share of national income is typically used as a broad measure to compare the level of spending across similar jurisdictions. In Ireland, spending as a share of GDP has ranged between 0.6% and just over 1% of GDP over the last twenty years. By way of comparison to other jurisdictions, although dated, a 2009 analysis of international policing expenditure across common law jurisdictions showed police spending in the range of 0.6% to almost 1.2% of GDP for the UK, Canada, New Zealand, the US and Australia.<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that there are caveats attaching to this comparison given the differing activities carried out

<sup>6</sup> Policy Exchange (2011) *Cost of the Cops*. London (p.26)

by policing in different countries. In particular, not all of these police forces perform the full suite of functions undertaken by An Garda Síochána (e.g. security, immigration).


For 2009, Ireland would be in the upper end of spending for that peer group. It should be noted that this year reflects the coinciding of the high point of policing expenditure with the rapid fall in Irish GDP. In the interim, policing expenditure as a share of GDP has declined, reflecting the rapid rise in GDP which has exceeded the rate of growth in policing investment. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP is now at a similar level to that seen prior to the onset of the financial crisis. The measure is obviously affected by sharp fluctuations in GDP.

In any event, using expenditure as a share of national income is of limited value because it ignores disparities in the structure of policing services in different jurisdictions as well as variations in the level of demand for policing services including crime rates. It is also affected by the well known caveats regarding the unusual gap between GNP and GDP in Ireland. It also does not reflect the quality, efficiency or effectiveness of policing expenditure.

## 2.2 Numbers in An Garda Síochána

Pay and pensions accounts for 84% of total Garda expenditure reflecting the fact that policing services consists largely of human services provided to the public and to other public bodies. Following the resumption of recruitment in 2014, Garda numbers by end 2016 (ranks only) amounted to 13,400<sup>7</sup> or 12,900 excluding trainees. This is broadly equivalent to trend level for much of the early to mid-2000s and higher than the previous decades. Figure 2 illustrates the broad trend in Garda numbers since the 1970s.

**Figure 2 Trend in Garda numbers 1980s to now (whole time equivalents)**



Source: INFOR system, DPER


<sup>7</sup> This includes student Gardaí.

Note: figures are valid as at quarter 4 each year and figures include student Gardaí.

The average number of Gardaí over the 1980s and 1990s was considerably lower than the last twenty years, ranging between 10,000 – 11,000. This was also a period where there were significant policing demands e.g. heightened security pressures arising from the Troubles, social unrest (1980s), gangland violence and drug offences (1980s/1990s). Garda numbers rose sharply in the late 2000s. This was driven by Programme for Government Commitments to reach a Garda rank figure of 15,000.

Figure 3 looks at Garda numbers relative to population showing that the number of Gardaí of 282 per 100,000 population is roughly 15% short of the 2006 peak of 333 Gardaí per 100,000 population. Overall the growth in policing numbers since 1981 is 34% compared to a population increase of 38%. The level of demand for policing is affected by more than just population increases and also depends on investment in ICT, the quality of policing expenditure as well as other drivers of expenditure such as crime trends or additional functions (e.g. protective services). Other relevant factors include the level of transnational crime and new modes of committing crimes (e.g. on-line) which can increase the complexity of investigations.

**Figure 3 Trend in Gardaí per 100,000 population, 1971 to 2016**




Source: CSO and INFOR system, DPER

Figure 4 shows an international comparison of policing per 100,000. The above analysis should be read with caution given the challenges in making and interpreting this international data. It shows that Ireland does not appear on the face of it to be underserved by police ranks compared to other small countries. The issue of population density is obviously a driver of increased demand for policing services due to urbanisation often being associated with higher crime levels and affects comparisons. The population density in Ireland is low.

The graph excludes city police services which could be comparable in terms of population because there may be multiple police services in cities (e.g. London) and these can be supplemented by national police services or other national security services as well as regional services. In some countries there also university police services. This renders comparisons complex. Unlike other countries, Ireland has a unitary service which should prevent inherent efficiencies and lead to lower staffing requirements as countries with multiple police services can exhibit duplication of function. Conversely, An Garda Síochána also incorporates national security services which are typically provided by another agency in other countries. The level/share of expenditure in Ireland on national security services would need to be used to allow for an adjustment of the figures to reflect this.

The caveats surrounding international comparisons also apply to some degree to other sectors e.g. the Defence Forces (see also Spending Review paper by Defence Vote Group). Nonetheless, it is worthwhile presenting the international data as a starting point for further analysis.

**Figure 4 International comparison of policing staff per 100,000 - 2016**




Sources: INFOR system, DPER as well as national statistics offices, annual police reports and Interpol website

Note: Garda data includes trainees which may affect comparisons

The foregoing has focussed mainly on Garda numbers (and including trainees). However, the civilian cohort is also an important component of total policing staffing. In many jurisdictions, civilians make up an increasing proportion of total staff – up to 33% in some cases. In Ireland, civilian numbers have remained static in the last decade at around 2,000 staff. During the recession and the related staffing moratorium, it was the view of Garda management that civilian vacancies should be filled by Garda members e.g. ICT. Section 3 will

consider civilianisation in more detail. The Garda Inspectorate has noted that Ireland has a low degree of civilianisation (13%) compared to other police services (20% to 30%).

**Figure 5 Trend in total policing staffing, including civilians, 2008 to 2017**



Source: INFOR system, DPER

### 2.3 Overtime and allowances

Allowances and overtime are two other significant components of the pay bill accounting together for almost 30% of total expenditure on Garda pay. Allowances account for approximately 20% of Garda pay. This section focuses mainly on overtime because allowances, while a significant element of pay expenditure, tend to be more fixed elements of the pay bill than overtime which can vary depending on business requirements (with the exception of unsocial hours allowances which are a function of rostered hours on Saturday and Sunday as well as non-rostered duty on Saturdays and night duty<sup>8</sup>).

Overtime is an important component of the pay bill as it can provide the flexibility to address policing priorities but also has the potential to rise rapidly and is an expensive use of resources due to the higher hourly rate of pay it attracts (at least 1.5 times hourly earnings). Increased use of overtime leads to an increase in average weekly earnings (see Appendix C for a summary of recent CSO statistics on Garda weekly pay). It is unrostered and represents a temporary increase in manpower to achieve policing objectives e.g. gangland crime operations.

<sup>8</sup> It should also be noted that there are rostered night duty allowances which cover all days of the week.




Unlike other expenditure headings, overtime budgets in An Garda Síochána are devolved down to the level of district superintendent with overtime reports generated electronically at regional, divisional and district level to review usage. Actual vs budget spending is analysed at the end of each roster by the Garda Finance Unit.

The main categories of overtime spending are organised crime, specific operations (such as Operation Thor), specialist units and regional policing (e.g. crime prevention, crime investigation, courts). The Garda Inspectorate notes that overtime on courts attendance could be reduced by ensuring Garda attendance during normal working hours.<sup>9</sup> Expenditure on courts overtime has declined from €15m in 2007 to an approximate figure of €11m/€12m in 2015 but there is still scope for further reduction. It should be noted that the recent labour court recommendations on Garda pay from late 2016 have implications for the overtime bill including the increase in the hourly rate of pay which impacts on the unit cost of each overtime hour as well as the introduction of pre-tour briefing (now an overtime cost).

Typically, overtime is regarded internationally as one of the main expenditure headings for police services where efficiencies can be generated using measures such as civilianisation, greater use of technology, reduced attendances at courts sittings, tighter budget controls, rosters which match peak demand for policing services with greater policing hours and reduced sick leave. Figure 6 illustrates the trend in overtime since 2005. Overtime rose significantly until 2007 but was curtailed during the period of fiscal consolidation.

**Figure 6 Trend in overtime and Garda rank numbers, 2005 to 2016**



Source: An Garda Síochána and DPER, 2016

<sup>9</sup> Garda Inspectorate (2009) *Resource Allocation Report*, Dublin (p37)

The recent increase in overtime can be attributed to special operations and additional policing initiatives to deal with burglary, the emergency response to gangland crime, port security as well as anti-terrorism measures.

At 9.3% of the overall pay bill, it is Government policy that overtime is reduced to international norms of 4%-5% over the period to 2021. This will be achieved in part through the addition of new staff. If the overtime bill is not carefully controlled, it can become resilient to reduction and the opportunity cost of continued overtime is high i.e. spending foregone on overtime represents money that can't be allocated towards ICT investment with longer term and more permanent benefits. It can also lead to a situation where increased recruitment leads to more overtime - the opposite of the desired effect.

Ultimately, the issue of controlling overtime expenditure and its resilience to additional Garda resources (new recruits, civilians, ICT) is not new. It will be important in the coming years to ensure that increased recruitment of both civilian and police staff, along with reforms, is matched by commensurate reductions in overtime.

### **3. Reform in An Garda Síochána**

#### **3.1 Reform context**

There have been a number of reports published in relation to An Garda Síochána since the early 2000s. Some of these arise from enquiries into allegations of misconduct, others from reviews of different aspects of the operation and administration of the organisation (principally by the Garda Inspectorate). These have each articulated to varying degrees, and focussing on different areas, the need for reforms and modernisation including of a legislative, procedural, management and cultural nature in An Garda Síochána and in relation to the oversight architecture for policing in Ireland. These include:

- Tribunals and Commissions of Investigation
  - Morris Tribunal – investigations of complaints regarding some Gardaí in the Donegal division
  - Barr Tribunal – investigation of facts surrounding the fatal shooting of a person at the Abbeylara siege in Co. Longford;
  - Mac Lochlainn Commission of Investigation – fatal shooting by An Garda Síochána of a suspect at a Securicor van robbery;
  - Fennelly Commission of Investigation – taping of phone calls at certain Garda stations, implications for the investigation into the death of Ms Sophie Toscan Du Plantier and the sequence of events leading up to the retirement of Commissioner Callinan; and

- O’Higgins Commission of Investigation (arising from the report of Mr Sean Guerin SC) – investigation of allegations of Garda malpractice related to the Cavan/Monaghan division.

There have also been reports on the operation of the Fixed Charge Processing System by the Office of the Comptroller & Auditor General, the PAC, the Garda Inspectorate and the Garda Professional Standards Units.

In addition to this, it is clear from the previous 11 reports of the Garda Inspectorate and its more than 570 recommendations<sup>10</sup> that there is a significant and highly comprehensive body of evidence-informed work on policing reform in Ireland. These comprehensive reports draw on extensive primary data analysis and international benchmarking to make detailed recommendations (see Appendix A). There are also currently two Policing Authority examinations underway in relation to traffic controversies (alcohol testing and wrongful conviction of motorists). The Garda Inspectorate is also currently carrying out a report on entry routes into An Garda Síochána.

### ***Institutional Context***

The new Policing Authority, which was established on 1 January 2016, was an important reform to the oversight arrangements for policing in Ireland. It has a key role to play in overseeing the modernisation of policing and policing accountability in Ireland. Two key functions include setting priorities and performance targets for An Garda Síochána (excluding security services) and approving Garda Síochána strategy statements and policing plans subject to the consent of the Minister for Justice and Equality. It also has important powers to nominate individuals for appointment by Government to the posts of Garda Commissioner and Deputy Garda Commissioner and also to appoint persons to the ranks of Superintendent, Chief Superintendent and Assistant Commissioner. There are other key workstreams worth mentioning here:

- a. The Authority’s ongoing oversight of implementation of Changing Policing in Ireland, with quarterly reports submitted to the Minister for Justice and Equality, two of which have been published with another due in July.;
- c. The Authority’s review (being undertaken by the Garda Inspectorate) into the adequacy of the arrangements for managing and deploying the resources available to the Garda Síochána so as to ensure the most beneficial, effective and efficient use of those resources.

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<sup>10</sup> See transcript of debate on Priorities for Garda Inspectorate at the Joint Committee for Justice and Equality on 19 October 2016 - <http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/JUJ2016101900002?opendocument#A00100>

A more detailed description of functions may be found on its website – [www.policingauthority.ie](http://www.policingauthority.ie) as well as the Garda Síochána Act 2005.

There are two other important bodies which play a role in Garda oversight. The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) was set up in 2007 and the Garda Inspectorate was established in 2006. GSOC deals with complaints against Gardaí and the Inspectorate carries out inspections/inquiries on particular aspects of the operation and administration of An Garda Síochána with the overall aim of ensuring that Garda resources are used efficiently and effectively. There are links between the three bodies and their roles are interconnected given their overall objective of better policing in Ireland e.g. the Policing Authority can request the Inspectorate to carry out an inspection (for further detail, see explanatory note on the Authority's website and the Garda Síochána Act 2005).

The roles and responsibilities of each of these bodies will be reviewed by the New Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland. Overall the best outcomes would be strong coherence of their collective functions as well as the most effective configuration of the three bodies to promote better oversight of policing.

The terms of reference for the new Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland provide for a comprehensive examinations of all aspects of policing. It will have the capability to make recommendations as it sees fit, in the short term, before its final report is completed.

### ***Modernisation and Renewal Programme***

There is now a Garda Reform programme in place. The Government Decision of 19 July 2016 approved a Five Year Reform and High-level Workforce Plan for An Garda Síochána. The plan addresses the implementation of both the agreed recommendations of the Garda Inspectorate report 'Changing Policing in Ireland' (December 2015) and the commitments in the Programme for Government aimed at increasing Garda visibility. The Commissioner's Modernisation and Renewal Programme 2016-2021 (MRP) is the vehicle for the implementation of the agreed recommendations of the Inspectorate report and the Government decision, overseen by the Policing Authority and the Department of Justice and Equality.


The headline reforms in the plan are civilianisation and the rollout of the Divisional/Functional model of policing (i.e. as opposed to district model). The high level workforce plan envisages an overall Garda workforce of 21,000 by 2021 comprising 15,000 Garda members (as per the PfG commitment), 4,000 civilians and 2,000 Reserves. One of the key targets of the reform plan is to make progress on civilianisation by ensuring that 20% of all police staff are civilians by 2020. As noted above, the Policing Authority have been requested to assess

the implementation of the reform initiatives by An Garda Síochána and to report progress on a quarterly basis. Two reports have been submitted and published to date.

Implementation of the Government decision in full has obvious implications for resourcing and public expenditure. Figure 7 presents a scenario for the trajectory of spending on An Garda Síochána in the event that the staffing elements of the decision are delivered over the period 2017 to 2020, based on D/Justice initial costings carried out in mid 2016. This scenario makes assumptions regarding the likely rate of increase in other elements of Garda non-pay but does not factor in any assumptions regarding pay increases resulting from the recently national pay talks proposals. The analysis was carried out a point in time and costs could be higher when all possible costing pay and non pay implications of the decision are taken into account.

The analysis shows that expenditure could increase by at least 12% culminating in approximately €1.8 billion by 2020. This is before any other operational increases are taken into account e.g. new legislative responsibilities, new policing operations (e.g. anti-terrorism), additional non-pay pressures (e.g. firearm equipment, training, travel) and other capital spending increases. The analysis includes the effects of retirements. It obviously depends on progress in recruitment and does not take into account any other capital needs which may emerge (e.g. accommodation for new staff) which will be a pressure on resources. It does not take account of any downstream cost impacts on other parts of the Justice system due to increased Garda activity. Accordingly, the estimates could be considered subject to significant downside risk.

**Figure 7 Potential increase in expenditure to meet the requirements of the Garda MRP, 2017 to 2020**



Source: D/Justice projections as at July 2016

This is a short term analysis and does not show the long term pension implications of increased Garda recruitment in particular given that the notional employer contribution rate for new Garda entrants is 14% (i.e. the cost of pensions to the employer less employee contributions) which is higher than most other areas of the public service<sup>11</sup> (this reflects the position set out in the Public Service Pay Commission Report)

The analysis above is not dynamic. For example, it does not take into account a range of factors which could exert downward pressure on Garda expenditure and resourcing needs e.g.:

- The impact of additional resources on reductions in the level of overtime from 10% to 4%-5% of pay;
- The scale of efficiencies which could potentially result from the current programme of ICT investment as well as the ongoing programme of divisional restructuring;
- The efficiency impact of further civilianisation including redeployment and increased reserves;
- Any other efficiencies which could be generated through changed working practices; and
- Savings due to crime prevention, among others.

Conversely, overall Garda expenditure could increase even further if recruitment takes place but reform measures are not achieved (e.g. if overtime is not reduced). This counterfactual is not presented here but without reform, many of the inefficient practices identified by the Inspectorate will continue and will pose an expenditure sustainability challenge.

The analysis demonstrates that increasing Garda expenditure in line with the Government decision will be costly. This reinforces the case for ensuring that Garda reform delivers targeted outcomes including those aspects which facilitate greater efficiency within existing resources.

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<sup>11</sup> This is based on the publicly available estimates set out in the DPER Technical Paper Submission to the Public Service Pay Commission on 30 March 2017.

## 3.2 Civilianisation

This paper focuses on civilianisation as one of the core reform pillars in the MRP. It is important from a public spending perspective because ultimately, the purpose of civilianisation is not just to achieve efficiencies but also to introduce specialist expertise to improve the effectiveness of policing services and to broaden the variety of perspectives of those working in the organisation. Civilianisation commonly refers to the replacement of Gardaí performing civilian/administrative roles with civilians and recruitment of civilians to perform specialist functions previously undertaken by Gardaí.

**Table 1 Timeline of Milestones for Civilianisation**

Year	Milestone
1970s	Garda civilian staff first introduced into An Garda Síochána (Conroy and Ryan Reports)
1992	Second report of Select Committee on Crime recommends additional civilianisation
1995	C&AG recommendation to increase civilianisation in OCAG Annual Report
2001	SMI Civilianisation Study Report: Provides framework for civilian appointments (556 posts)
2005	Government decision to redeploy 300 posts from other Departments to civilian roles in AGS
2006	Approval of 300 clerical officers to be accompanied by equivalent Garda redeployment
2007	Approval of 300 civilian staff recruitment to be accompanied by redeployment of Gardaí
2014	Civilianisation of immigration control at Dublin Airport in two phases - 160 staff in total
2016	Government decision on Garda Reform - 2,000 new civilians to be recruited with a policy of “civilian by default” in filling posts + working to 20% share of policing staff comprising civilians
2017	Funding provided for the recruitment of up to 500 civilian staff in 2017 to address capacity and skills gaps to support civilianisation through the “civilian by default policy” and redeployment of Gardaí in technical/administrative roles.
2017	AGS plans to civilianise 160 posts through redeployment
2017	Publication of first and second quarterly progress reports by Policing Authority

Adapted from Garda Inspectorate and C&AG reports

The timeline indicates that civilianisation has been a long standing policy goal of successive Governments and the rationale for civilianisation has been well articulated on several occasions. Nonetheless, success has been limited. For example, in the last ten years, the proportion of civilians as a share of total police staffing has increased from 11% to 13% - a 2% change. The long term lack of progress can be attributed to several factors including:

- The impact of recruitment moratoriums including the most recent one;
- Lack of an integrated HR system with data on staff deployment by function, grade and area;
- Insufficient visible commitment to the policy goal;

- The impact of the financial crisis;
- The absence of established targets for civilianisation which are robustly enforced; and
- The absence of robust workforce planning framework which links demand for civilian posts in specific functions with plans to release Gardaí performing civilian roles to specific Garda units

To date, 43 posts have been identified as suitable for redeployment this year (3% of the Inspectorate target), with a further 68 posts identified as suitable for redeployment as part of the introduction of a divisional policing model. The Policing Authority have noted that while An Garda Síochána have identified approximately 800 posts as being in receipt of administrative allowances and therefore suitable for redeployment as an initial exercise for scoping the redeployment programme, *“there is reason to be apprehensive that the aspiration to achieve the Inspectorate’s target of 1,500 (which has not been displaced by any robust evidence provided by the Garda Síochána) will be achieved without a great deal more effort, leadership and local and regional commitment to what is a Government decision and an organisational priority”*.<sup>12</sup> The Policing Authority also questions the level of engagement with the idea of civilianisation in An Garda Síochána and the commitment to its achievement. It should be noted that the civilianisation process is ongoing and the pace may quicken. Ultimately, the Policing Authority will report on this.

In the past there have been different mechanisms employed to accelerate the pace of civilianisation including the attachment of conditionality to staffing sanctions issued by the Department of Finance and the use of an independent verification group to validate achievement of civilianisation targets. There is now a renewed impetus on accelerating civilianisation with new instruments to drive implementation such as the multi-year Government commitment, the setting of a specific five year target of 20% (civilians as a proportion of total policing service), the role of the Policing Authority in monitoring and assessing the implementation of reforms and reporting to the Department of Justice as well as the continued work of the Garda Inspectorate in highlighting problems with the pace of civilianisation in its inspections.

The Garda Inspectorate summarises the future challenge for civilianisation as follows: *“There is a need for greater governance over workforce modernisation practices with emphasis on establishing targets for the return of members to operational duties as the desired outcome of Garda staff recruiting. Targets need to include the impact of changes on the service and not just focus on the numbers recruited. Evidence based need should drive personnel decisions, including allocation of staff, as a function of workforce planning”*<sup>13</sup>.

Importantly, the Garda workforce plan currently being developed is the key tool to set out the evidence underpinning the actions which will deliver civilianisation by outlining which posts, currently occupied by

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<sup>12</sup> Policing Authority (2017) Monitoring and assessment of the measures taken by the Garda Síochána to implement recommendations of the Garda Inspectorate Report “Changing Policing in Ireland. Dublin (p11)

<sup>13</sup> Garda Inspectorate (2015) *Changing Policing in Ireland*. Dublin (p 307)



Gardaí, can be filled by civilians thereby releasing Gardaí to specific frontline policing roles. This plan also has the potential to articulate where the new civilian recruits will be placed i.e. which roles. For example, areas such as internal audit, financial accounting, management accounting and the Garda Analytical Service would seem like natural areas for further development. Beyond those, there are also new potential areas of specialism such as ballistics, forensics, cybercrime and front of station desk roles. Work on civilianising some of these functions is already underway as some functions are due to transfer to Forensic Science Ireland (e.g. forensics) and candidates from an FSI competition will be seconded to the Garda Technical Bureau (GTB) to fill existing vacancies ahead of the merger (FSI with GTB). It will be important to conduct an evaluation in the next five years of the success of civilianisation – a key barometer will be the additional outputs which have been facilitated by the additional recruitment.

It should be noted that the workforce plan is not just limited to issues such as civilianisation but also encompasses:

- Open / lateral methods of recruitment (subject of an existing Inspectorate report);
- Diversity of recruitment issues;
- Supervision;
- Allocation of policing resources by area; and
- Demand for policing resources (see also section 4)

### **3.3 Case Study on Civilianisation Savings (redeployment)**

Table 2 below illustrates the potential savings per rank if Gardaí currently undertaking civilian roles are replaced by civilians for selected Garda ranks. This is indicatively estimated at a total approximate annual salary saving of €45m based on 1,500 civilians (per the Inspectorate analysis) replacing Garda members on the current proportional breakdown of ranks. This is by its nature an assumptions based estimate and actual savings may vary. A somewhat similar approach was used by the C&AG in a 2008 Annual Report Chapter on civilianisation.<sup>14</sup> The savings in Table 2 are driven by the absence of allowances payments required for civilians, the difference in salary rates for each grade. There are also significant differences between the accelerated pension arrangements of Gardaí and the normal arrangements of civilians but these are not captured in the table. It should be noted that the equivalence of civilian grades for certain Garda ranks is for analytical purposes here and is based on the application of the OCAG typology from 2008.

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<sup>14</sup> Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (2008) *Garda Civilianisation* Dublin.

There is also a benefit through the release of hours to the frontline through redeployment which is in the order of 2.5 million hours for the Garda to Inspector ranks or 10% of all Garda hours.

**Table 2 Illustrative savings for civilianisation by selected grade (redeployment)**

<b>Garda Rank to Civilian Rank (number)</b>	<b>Garda Salaries + Allowances - €m</b>	<b>Civilian Salaries</b>	<b>Total Annual Salary Savings allowances- €m</b>	<b>Hours Released - m</b>
Garda to CO (1,167)	71.5	33.6	37.9	2.12
Sergeant to EO (214)	14.9	8.2	6.7	0.38
Inspector to HEO (34)	2.5	1.7	0.8	0.06
<b>Totals</b>	<b>90.0</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>2.5</b>

Source: Adapted from OCAG typology (numbers have been rounded accounting for differences in numbers)

Note

1. Salary savings incorporate allowances but exclude overtime and employers PRSI
2. Salaries for both Gardaí and civilians are based on midpoints for the 2017 paycales
3. The allowances uplifts exclude rent allowance. The allowances uplift are based on percentages derived from salary breakdowns published as part of the HRA Review carried out by J. Horgan December 2-16.
4. The various LRC pay award components are reflected in the analysis (e.g. pre tour briefings and unsocial hours allowances)
5. The distribution of the 1,500 target has been estimated based on the current distribution of ranks
6. The estimate of hours released is based on an annual hours worked of approximately 1,800 per Garda

On the issue of pensions, significant savings arise from the fact that Gardaí can retire earlier than civil servants and therefore there is a longer period of pension earnings for Gardaí compared to civil servants. The average age of Gardaí retiring (at all ranks) ranged from 55.5 (Garda) to 58.7 (Assistant Commissioner) whereas the equivalent average for civil servants is much higher at [80% retire at 60+]. Gardaí generally accrue their pensions over 30 years instead of 40 years compared to civil servants (similar arrangements apply in the Defence Forces and for psychiatric nurses) due to the physical nature of their posts. The average age will likely increase over time as the age of recruits increases and taking into account the fact that in 2004 the age at which a Garda may retire on full pension with 30 years of service increased from 50 years to 55 years. Based on the recently published Public Service Pay Commission report, the notional employer pension contribution rate for pre-2013 Garda members is approximately 53% (net of employee contributions). This compares to a figure of 8% for post 2013 for new civilian recruits – a margin of 45%. Over time this margin will decrease as new Garda entrants (approximately 15% of the Garda ranks) become a greater proportion of An Garda

Síochána. The notional employer contribution rate for Gardaí recruited post 2013 is 14% (per the Public Service Pay Commission report).

Table 2 does not also include the impact of additional hours on potential reductions in overtime through releasing Garda to frontline policing. Even if 20% of these hours arising from the redeployment of 1,500 Gardaí could be utilised to reduce overtime, this would save up to €14m annually (for an hourly overtime rate of €32.5 for a Garda on the midpoint of the scale).

## **4. Towards New Models of Resource Allocation**

### **4.1 Current position**

Given the trajectory of expenditure on An Garda Síochána and the range of operational pressures facing policing in Ireland, it is important that the model for allocating resources to An Garda Síochána is robust. Consistent with the increased focus on evidence informed policy making across Government, there should be scope to increase the role of evidence as part of the budgetary process to advise Government on aggregate resource allocation decisions.

In the first instance, changes in the drivers of demand for policing services should be an important input into the budgetary process. Typically demand for policing services can be categorised as follows and among others:

- Trends in reported crime;
- Calls for services (emergency and non-emergency calls for service);
- Protective services such as support for victims of sexual assault;
- Requests for collaboration/engagement with other agencies e.g. health, prisons, children's services;
- Need for collaboration/engagement with police services in other jurisdictions;
- Safeguarding work – community meetings, intelligence work etc.;
- Protecting the security of the State;
- Large scale public events;
- Creation of new criminal offences; and
- Public perception of crime.

In considering the demand for policing services, it is also worth noting that crime varies by intensity and there can be significant differences in the resources required to investigate different forms of crime. New crimes arise which can be complex and costly to investigate e.g. cybercrime. Certain categories of recorded instances of crime can increase as a result of increased Garda presence and activity such as drugs related offences.

Some of the demand factors listed above are not straightforward or easy to measure. For example, there is evidence of the underreporting of crime (as found for example in the CSO Crime and Victimization Survey 2016) and deficiencies in the quality of data on recorded crime (categorisation, integrity) have been the subject of CSO and Inspectorate reports (see Appendix D for a summary of the recent falling trend in some reported crime).

Incompleteness in crime statistics is also a feature in other jurisdictions. Crime data is also not a full measure of crime and therefore official statistics have to be balanced with victimisation studies and other research based approaches to arrive at a more complete analysis of the effects of crime and the implications for policing resources.

A better understanding of the typical demand for policing services, informed by comprehensive analysis, would allow An Garda Síochána to match deployment with demand (e.g. through greater use of Computer Aided Dispatch software). It would also allow for an improvement in demand management by getting responses right first time and using predictive policing to target hotspots where demand for policing services has been high in the past. The Garda Analytical Service has been carrying out work in this area. In addition, An Garda Síochána already uses a model to determine the geographical distribution of policing resources based on factors such as crime incidence and population growth (it would constitute a useful case study to assess how the model has been applied over the last number of years to some of the higher population areas).

There is also a particular need for any new HR Management Systems to provide reliable, up to date and timely information in relation to demand led requirements and deployment of human resources. This can inform Workforce planning, resource budgeting and flexible, responsive and efficient deployment of resources.

Overall it is worth noting that, as highlighted by Garda Inspectorate reports, investment in appropriate ICT can facilitate better tracking of resource allocation and effectiveness.

## **4.2 Funding Models in other jurisdictions**

Weaknesses in demand modelling are not unusual among police services internationally. The National Audit Office have noted that Police Services in the UK have insufficient understanding of the demand for their services.<sup>15</sup> It is complex to link demand with resources and outputs given the fact that human services are at the heart of policing as well as the influence of other factors on some of the typical measures for policing performance (e.g. crime trends) and also because some of the work is preventative in nature. In addition,

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<sup>15</sup> National Audit Office (2015) Financial sustainability of police forces in England Wales. P7

some of the factors influencing demand and which draw on resources are driven by the external environment and are not controllable by police (e.g. alcohol sales and the night time economy).

When considering funding models, the central Government funding approach in Ireland for policing is not the only approach. In the UK there are other funding streams for policing in addition to Central Government funding. In England and Wales, the main source of income for the regional police services comes from the annual Home Office Police Grant Report, a central government grant providing both current and capital funding. The funding formula is a relative model and is allocated based on a national formula (developed from statistical regression models) which link funding for different police services to factors such as crime trends, fear of crime and special events policing. This grant is provided 'un-ringfenced' to the locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), who are charged with setting budgetised priorities. However, in England, services also have access extra revenue by way of council tax precepts. The level of the precept is determined by the PCC. There is also enhanced funding for the Metropolitan Police in London given its highly urbanised nature and there are separate grants for specific purposes such as forensic DNA specialisms. These models obviously have developed in a context where there are multiple police services which is not the case in Ireland. Ultimately while these models are applied in practice, the UK experience has been that final resource allocation decisions are matters for Government and adjustments are made to these models before the final spending allocations are made i.e. funding is not solely based on an allocation formula.

### **4.3 Performance framework**

#### *Better indicators*

Appendix D sets out a programme logic model, on an illustrative basis, which takes the major policing functions (e.g. confronting crime, national security etc.) set out in the Annual Garda Policing Plan and shows some examples of output, efficiency and outcome indicators which could be used to inform future resourcing decisions in the context of demonstrable progress in Garda reform. For example, with increased policing numbers and continued reductions in the level of recorded crime, some improvement in the rate of detection for some crimes might be expected. The model shows the complexity and interrelated nature of different policing functions. This is for illustrative purposes only and is not exhaustive. Ultimately, the format structure and feasibility of reporting in this manner would be a matter for further detailed analysis and review by the Department of Justice and Equality, the Policing Authority and An Garda Síochána.

The annual performance report in relation to An Garda Síochána compiled by this Department and informed by analysis provided by An Garda Síochána contains some useful output indicators such as vetting applications and speed camera enforcement. However clearance rate indicators such as the detection rate as well as

efficiency indicators such as the timeliness of the response to crime/non crime incidents also merit inclusion. The same applies to the performance indicators published in the revised estimates for the Garda vote.

### Evaluations

Specific Garda sub-programmes tend not to be the subject of ex post evaluations in the same way as other expenditure programmes. There is scope to carry out these evaluations to inform decisions about their continuation e.g. operations aimed at disrupting criminal gangs carrying out thefts. While there are difficulties in carrying out control group type analysis and there can be challenges with data lags, there should be scope to assess the before/after impact of these operations, especially given the pareto rule with some types of crime (80% of crimes related to 20% of offenders). This could usefully incorporate perspectives of citizens on the effectiveness of policing in a given area. There are good examples of promising programmes which aim to prevent crime such as early intervention schemes which attempt to reduce crime and increase educational attainment as well as schemes to tackle prolific offenders through multi-stakeholder collaboration (e.g. the Joint Agency Response to Crime). These merit evaluation to demonstrate the scope for wider application and to test new approaches both from process and effectiveness perspectives.

Ultimately, such evaluations should be published to inform the public debate, and, as is the case with other Government sectors, these could be carried out by a variety of bodies including both An Garda Síochána, the Department of Justice and other research bodies including those oversight bodies in the policing sector where appropriate.

## **5. Findings**

The key findings/conclusions of this paper can be summarised as follows:

- The July 2016 Government Decision approving a five year reform and high level workforce plan for An Garda Síochána is estimated to lead to total Garda Expenditure increasing by at least 12% to approximately €1.8 billion by 2020. This is indicative and is based on projections made in 2016 and before other pressures are taken into account such as the new pay agreement, new policing operations, related non pay pressures and new capital projects including those which may arise due to increased accommodation requirements for new staff.
- Despite some isolated examples (Dublin Airport, Garda Analytical Service) in the past and more recently, the pace of reform on civilianisation including redeployment, one of the core priorities for reform, remains slow – this is consistent with past experience and is due to a wide range of factors.

There is still scope for the pace of civilianisation to accelerate under the current reform programme and work is ongoing in this regard.

- If the Garda Inspectorate figure for posts which could be subject to civilianisation was achieved (1,500), the total annual salary saving is estimated to be in the order of €45m and an indicative total of 2.5m policing hours could be released to operational policing. There would also be significant pensions savings given the margin between the notional employer contribution rate for pre 2013 Gardaí compared to post 2013 civil servants (53% vs 8%). The margin decreases as the proportion of new Gardaí on the post 2013 scheme enter the service (14% vs 8%). Increasing the pace of civilianisation would facilitate efficiencies to fund other Garda priorities (e.g. recruitment) as well as lower overtime and would allow An Garda Síochána to increase the volume of policing services it can deliver within a given resourcing footprint.
- There is merit in exploring other possibilities in resource allocation for An Garda Síochána in addition to the traditional budgetary approach. In particular, developing a more granular approach to the funding and review of performance for specific policing priorities (e.g. crime operations, security) could help demonstrate and validate the policing dividend for communities arising from additional investment. This could include elements of an activity based model. Although such models can be complex to introduce (e.g. apportionment of costs etc.) it would help make the budgetary process more evidence based.
- Linked to the above, there is the potential to build on the existing Garda model by developing an enhanced resource allocation model for policing drawing on parameters such as population, crime trends and other demand factors similar to those employed for other sectors e.g. education. This would be a useful input into the workforce planning process as well as the resource allocation process. The CAD (computer aided dispatch) project being prioritised could feed into providing some of the evidence and data for such allocations. Additionally, the review requested by the Minister for Justice and Equality last year regarding the disbursement of Garda resources, (which the Garda Inspectorate is currently undertaking for the Policing Authority), is intended to produce recommended criteria for the beginning of such a resource allocation model.
- The Government vision is for additional investment in An Garda Síochána to provide visible, effective and responsive policing. While additional investment may be forthcoming, subject to affordability constraints, it must be linked to demonstrated reforms. The Garda Inspectorate have produced a

comprehensive set of recommendations as part of the Changing Policing in Ireland report which act as a blueprint for reform. From a public expenditure perspective, the key priorities for 21st Century Policing in Ireland arising from the Government's Garda Reform and investment programme, can be summarised as:

- Significant increases in civilianisation facilitated by the redeployment of Garda members, the civilian by default policy and the recruitment of new civilians;
- A robust data infrastructure for recording and reporting police statistics;
- A more granular system to connect inputs with outputs and outcomes with a view to increasing the evidence of effectiveness;
- Increased levels of timely performance reporting on the outputs and outcomes of policing including efficiency measures (e.g. proportion of workforce working on frontline policing, volume of emergency calls etc.);
- Reduction of overtime to sustainable levels (4%-5% of pay)
- A structured system to budget for overtime by category (e.g. courts, crime investigation) including a contingency for expected ad hoc events (e.g. State visits); and
- Modelling the distribution of human resources by reference to population and demand; and
- Utilisation of ICT and analytics to match policing resources to times and locations of peak demand as well as to promote greater productivity and effectiveness.

## **6. Future Work**

This is the first paper by staff in DPER examining Garda/policing expenditure. It is planned that further papers relating to An Garda Síochána will be completed as part of subsequent Spending Reviews. Future papers may explore the following topics:

- Efficient and effective deployment of capital resources e.g. vehicle fleet management;
- Resource deployment e.g. matching rostering with demand and the role of reward systems;
- Performance management – developing a comprehensive set outputs and outcomes;
- Overtime expenditure – drivers, control and reporting; and
- Modelling the drivers of policing demand.



## Appendix A Selected overview of Garda Inspectorate Findings

### Garda Structures

- Governance is unclear
- There are many redundant bureaucratic practices and duplicative functions
- The Garda regional and divisional structure is inefficient.
- Out of kilter with reforms in other police services (UK, Scandinavia, New Zealand).
- Front-line policing has not been protected by An Garda. All international police services examined, without exception, have significantly reduced the number of regions/divisional structures.
- An Garda continues to use a district model in operation since the establishment of An Garda Síochána.

### Garda Operations

- Widespread inconsistencies in the delivery of policing services
- Districts operating different practices
- Vehicle and people tracking technology, available to An Garda, is not operating nationally
- Too many people are working the Garda roster that does not place them on duty at the right times of the day and week.
- Garda resources are not allocated in terms of policing need and crime levels
- Lack of suitable Garda fleet, no rationale for allocation of fleet

### Other Findings

- Duplication of administrative functions, unnecessary bureaucracy.
- Significant numbers of Garda in non-operational roles performing administrative duties.
- 27% of superintendents, 24% of inspectors, 16% of sergeants, 12% of Gardaí not assigned to operational duties.
- Over time, as the number of operational and specialist roles have reduced, admin roles in Garda HQ have increased by over 8%.
- There are approximately 700 untrained Detectives.
- Untrained Detectives appointed without training in some cases for 10 years.
- There is no way to objectively measure performance.
- Crimes not always recorded, domestic violence cases not always correctly recorded
- Significant under-recording of burglary and attempted burglary

Source: Selected Garda Inspectorate Reports

The MRP represents An Garda Síochána's response to the recognised need for reform and takes into account the full range of previous reports by the Inspectorate over the past 10 years as well as many other internal and external reports.

It is also worth noting that for the first 9 reports published by the Garda Inspectorate encompassing 281 recommendations, 272 have been reported as completed by An Garda Síochána. The outstanding recommendations relate to the Resource Allocation Report and the Report on Front Line Supervision.

The Strategic Transformation Office of An Garda Síochána are working with the Garda Inspectorate in relation to the recommendations associated with Inspectorate Report 10 (Crime Investigation) of which there are over 190. In relation to the Changing Policing in Ireland report by the Inspectorate, the Policing Authority has noted in its second quarterly report (as required under section 117a(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005) that 43 of the 244 recommendations have been marked as complete.

## Appendix B Distribution of Garda Resources (including staffing)

Table B.1 Distribution of resources by function for An Garda Síochána 2015

Function	Percentage Distribution of Pay bill
<i>Senior Management Functions</i>	0.5
Commissioner and Chief Admin Officer	0.3
Dep. Commissioner Operations	0.0
Dep. Commissioner Strategic Change	0.2
<i>National and Specialist Services</i>	9.7
National Support Services	4.8
Crime & Security	4.6
Traffic	0.3
<i>Regions</i>	84.0
DMR Region	29.0
Southern Region	15.3
Eastern Region	10.7
Western	10.9
Northern Region	9.6
South eastern Region	8.6
<i>Support Functions</i>	5.8
HRM (incl. College)	2.6
Organisation Development	1.8
ICT	0.7
Finance and Services	0.5
Legal, Press Office and Internal Audit	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: DPER analysis of Garda Regional and Divisional Payroll Expenditure - 2015

The table above shows that over 80% of resources are allocated to regional policing with approximately 10% allocated to national services and specialist services.

**Table B2 Distribution of Garda ranks by grade, 2008 and 2016 (WTE at end December)**

	2008	2016	Mix 2008	Mix 2016	% Change
Commissioner	1	1	0.0	0.0	-
Deputy Commissioner	2	2	0.0	0.0	-
Assistant Commissioner	12	8	0.1	0.1	-
Chief Superintendent	52	45	0.3	0.3	-
Superintendent	187	165	1.2	1.2	-
Inspector	344	308	2.2	2.3	+ 0.1
Sergeant	2,229	1,941	14.5	14.5	-
Garda	11,585	10,427	75.4	77.8	+2.2
<b>Total (excl. trainees)</b>	<b>14,412</b>	<b>12,897</b>	<b>93.9</b>	<b>96.2</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Trainees / Student Gardaí	944	507	6.1	3.8	- 2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,356</b>	<b>13,404</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>

Source: Infor system, DPER

Note: Excludes traffic wardens

The table above shows that while the actual numbers at each rank have reduced to varying degrees, the distribution/mix of ranks has not changed significantly since 2008 (i.e. the proportion that each rank makes up of the total)

**Table B3 Distribution of civilian staff by grade, 2008 and 2016 (WTE at end December)**

	2008	2016	Mix 2008	Mix 2016	% Change
Assistant Secretary	2	4	0.2	0.2	-
Principal Officer	8	10	0.5	0.5	-
Assistant Principal	24	25	1.3	1.2	-0.1
Higher Executive Officer	82	82	4.2	3.9	-0.3
Administrative Officer	3	11	0.6	0.5	-0.1
Executive Officer	97	119	6.2	5.7	-0.5
Clerical Officer + Staff Officer	1,565	1,596	82.1	75.9	-6.2
Other (includes industrials)	163	256	13.2	<b>12.2</b>	<b>-1.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,944</b>	<b>2,103</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>

Source: Infor system, DPER

Note: The category other includes groups such as cleaners, attendants. Teachers and general operatives. Totals may not match totals on the DPER databank due to differences in the inclusion of certain categories of staff.

**Table B4 Distribution of staff by region and HQ/specialist function, 2011 to 2016**

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2011 Mix</b>	<b>2016 Mix</b>
			<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<i>Region</i>				
Dublin Metropolitan	4,210	3,705	30	29
Eastern	1,453	1,380	10	11
Southern	2,257	2,083	16	16
Northern	1,422	1,299	10	10
South Eastern	1,307	1,262	9	10
Western	1,498	1,461	11	11
<i>Head Quarters/Specialist Function</i>				
HQ , Specialist and National Units	1,747	1,753	13	14
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13,894</b>	<b>12,953</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


Source: Garda Website - table titled "Garda Staffing Levels as of 31/12/2016 " and equivalent for 2011.

The geographical distribution of resources has not changed significantly since 2011.

## Appendix C Earnings in An Garda Síochána

In Quarter 1 2017 average weekly earnings for employees of AGS were the highest in the Public Service at €1,206 broadly equivalent to the same period in 2016. This is demonstrated in figure C1 below. The factors influencing weekly earnings include the level of new recruitment (reduces the average), pay increases, the extent of irregular earnings and the overall trend in the Garda numbers (higher numbers reduces the average).


**Figure C1: Average Weekly Earnings in Public Sector, Quarter 1 2017**



Source: CSO

The level of weekly earnings is also affected by the number of hours worked and Gardaí work more hours per week than other categories of public servant as illustrated in Figure C2 below.

**Figure C2: Average Weekly Earnings in Public Sector, Quarter 1 2017**



Source: CSO


## Appendix D Indicative Programme Logic Model for An Garda Síochána

<b>Policing Objective</b>	<b>Output and Efficiency Indicators</b>
<b>Confronting Crime</b>	
<i>Output</i>	% Policing Hours Allocated to Frontline Policing
	Number of incidents logged
	Number of firearm/drugs/asset seizures
	Number of joint operations with other agencies
<i>Efficiency</i>	Response times to incident by type
	Numbers and rates of detections by category (cautions, arrests)
	Unit cost of investigation per crime
<i>Outcomes</i>	Decreased reported level of crime e.g. burglary
	Increased victim satisfaction levels (survey based)
	Increased reporting of certain crimes – sexual offences
<b>Org. Development +Capacity Improvement</b>	
<i>Output</i>	% police time allocated to reactive and protective priorities
	Reduction in overtime hours
	Average sick leave days per officer
	Proportion of MRP projects completed
	Training hours completed
<i>Efficiency</i>	Timeliness of MRP project completion
<i>Outcomes</i>	Perceived workforce satisfaction per rank
	Number of complaints made to GSOC
<b>Community Engagement and Public Safety</b>	
<i>Output</i>	Number of patrols
	% police time allocated to community projects/initiatives
	% of schools visited by Gardaí as part of local initiatives
<i>Efficiency</i>	Timeliness of response to incidents
	Proportion of public events support by Garda Reserves
<i>Outcomes</i>	Levels of perceived fear of crime (survey based)
<b>National and International Security</b>	
<i>Outputs</i>	Number of checkpoints
	Number of intelligence led operations
	Firearm seizures
	Number of hours of collaboration/initiatives with minority groups
<i>Efficiency</i>	Timeliness of response to terrorist/cyber crime incidents
	Percentage of operations informed by analytical intelligence systems
<i>Outcomes</i>	Prevented terrorist incidents
	Number of interceptions
	Reduction in the incidence of cybercrime

Source: Adapted from Garda Síochána Policing Plan for 2017 and DPER analysis


It should be noted that the 2017 Policing Plan published by An Garda Síochána also contains performance measures under each of the main policing programmes.

**Figure D1 Trend in reported crime, 2005 to 2016, selected offence groups**



Source: CSO

**Figure D2 Trend in reported crime, 2005 to 2016, selected offence groups**



Source: CSO



While figures D1 and D2 shows the trends in reported crime for selected crime categories, it is important to note that:

- Crime vary in terms of intensity and there can be significant differences in the resources required to investigate different types of crime.
- In its 2016 Review of the Quality of Crime Statistics, the CSO noted the continued existence of certain issues with the crime incidence statistics e.g. non recording of crime and misclassification of crime. The CSO is working with An Garda Síochána to improve the quality of Garda statistics.

Incompleteness in the crime statistics is something which is not confined to this jurisdiction. Internationally, police data is not considered to be a full measure of crime and therefore official crime statistics have to be balanced with victimisation studies and other research based approaches to arrive at a more complete analysis of the effects of crime and the implications for policing resources.